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DOMESTIC RELATIONS - SUPPORT OF STEPCHILDREN -
OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT STEPCHILD HELD TO BE A
DEBT, NOT A LEGAL DUTY, AND THEREFORE STEP-
PARENT'S CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR DEFAULT IN SUP-
PORT PAYMENTS CANNOT BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISON-
MENT. BROWN v. BROWN, 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial aspects of domestic relations law
in the United States today is that of child support and the enforce-
ment of child support orders. To compel the performance of these
orders, many states allow courts to imprison those who have
defaulted in support payments and who are therefore in contempt of
court.' Maryland's position on this method of enforcement is con-
trolled by article III, section 38 of the Constitution of Maryland,
which prohibits imprisonment for debt.' In its original form,' this
prohibition extended to such obligations as child support and wife
support because they were considered debts. 4 Amendments added in
1950 and 1962,6 however, excluded orders and decrees for payment
of wife support, alimony, illegitimate child support, and dependent
child support from the section's definition of a debt. The justification
for this exclusion was that these obligations were considered legal
and moral duties and therefore were not debts.7 By removing these
obligations from the protection afforded to debts under the Constitu-
tion of Maryland, the equity courts of Maryland were given the
power to enforce such support and alimony decrees by imprison-
ment.
8
In Brown v. Brown,9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland con-
cluded that a stepchild was not a "dependent child" within the mean-
ing of article III, section 38 because, unlike a dependent child, a step-
1. Annot., 172 A.L.R. 869 (1948). See e.g., Wells v. Wells, 358 A.2d 648 (D.C. 1976); State ex
reL Stanhope v. Pratt, 533 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. 1976); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 154
S.E.2d 71 (1976).
2. MD. CONST. art. III, § 38. Section 38 reads:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, but a valid decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for the support of a
wife or dependent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or children,
or for alimony, shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of this section.
3. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 44.
4. See text accompanying notes 32-49 infr,.
5. Law of March 28, 1950, ch. 15, § 1, 1950 Md. Laws 249 (embodied in MD. CONsT. art. III,
§ 38).
6. Law of April 6, 1962, ch. 121, § 1, 1962 Md. Laws 387 (embodied in MD. CONST. art. III,
§ 38).
7. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 283, 412 A.2d 396, 401 (1980).
8. Id at 282, 412 A.2d at 401.
9. 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980).
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child was not "entitled to support by virtue of a legal duty."' 0 Based
on this conclusion, the court held that a stepparent's obligation to
pay support for his stepchild, according to the provisions of a separa-
tion agreement incorporated into a divorce decree, is not a legal duty
but rather a "debt for which the constitution affords him immunity
from incarceration."" The court also reaffirmed its previous posi-
tion12 that imprisonment is generally not an available remedy of
equity courts for the enforcement of money decrees, 1 except of
course for the exceptions stated in section 38.
This casenote discusses the historical background of imprison-
ment for debt, its abolition in the United States, and the evolution of
exceptions to the rule prohibiting imprisonment. It also surveys the
policy reasons behind the exceptions that were made part of the Con-
stitution of Maryland by the passage of the 1950 and 1962 amend-
ments to article III, section 38. Finally, the Brown decision is
analyzed and the remedies now available for nonsupport of step-
children are examined.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Ronald K. Brown and Joyce A. Brown were divorced on October
22, 1976.14 Incorporated into the divorce decree was a previously exe-
cuted separation agreement in which Ronald Brown agreed to pay
for the support of his stepchild."6 Mr. Brown soon fell into arrears in
the support payments. In a contempt proceeding brought against
Mr. Brown for failing to make these payments, he was adjudged to
be in contempt of court and was sentenced to 179 days in jail. From
this sentence he appealed. Prior to the consideration of the case by
the court of special appeals, the court of appeals granted certiorari.'6
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMPRISONMENT
FOR DEBT
A. Imprisonment for Debt
Imprisonment for debt had already acquired a long and
checkered history in Europe before its adoption in the American-
colonies. In early Rome, a debtor was arrested in the initiation of a
creditor's action to assure his appearance at trial' 7 If creditors
10. Id at 283, 412 A.2d at 402.
11. Id at 284, 412 A.2d at 402.
12. See Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928).
13. 287 Md. 273, 287, 412 A.2d 396, 403 (1980).
14. Id at 275, 412 A.2d at 397.
15. Id The child was born to Joyce A. Brown prior to the marriage of the parties.
16. Id at 276, 412 A.2d at 398.
17. W. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 968 (2d ed. 1885).
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secured a judgment against the debtor and it remained unpaid, the
debtor could be imprisoned, sold into slavery, or even cut into pieces
proportionate to each creditor's claim.18 Imprisonment was an effec-
tive, coercive device to enforce payment of the judgment; slavery
and death were measures used only if the debtor's property were
insufficient to satisfy the judgment. 9
A similar procedure of arrest at the initiation of a creditor's
action existed in England prior to the Norman conquest. 20 The prac-
tice of imprisonment of the debtor to insure payment of a judgment
disappeared, however, during the feudal period because it was incon-
sistent with the feudal concept that a vassal was required to serve
his lord. 21 When the feudal system dispensed with the requirement of
the personal service of vassals, Parliament enacted statutes that
once again permitted the arrest of a debtor to insure his appearance
at trial.22 Under the Statute of Acton Burnell of 1283, a debtor could
avoid immediate incarceration by embodying his obligation in a
bond of special form which, upon default, entitled the creditor to levy
upon the debtor's chattels.23 Only if the chattels were insufficient to
satisfy the debt could the debtor be imprisoned.24 With the passage
of the Statute of Merchants two years later, a creditor could have a
debtor incarcerated without first proving that the debtor's chattels
upon which the creditor could levy were insufficient to satisfy the
debt.25 Between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, the English
common law developed two forms of legal process for imprisoning a
debtor who had not agreed to embody his obligation in a bond: a writ
of capias ad respondendum to bring the debtor into court and a writ
of capias ad satisfaciendum to hold him until the judgment entered
against him was satisfied.26 The latter form of process was recog-
nized by the colonial Maryland Assembly,27 as it was in various ways
by most of the colonies until reforms began sweeping the country in
the 1830's.18
18. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 618-20 (3d ed. 1966).
19. Note, Present Status of Execution Against the Body of the Judgment Debtor, 42 IOWA L.




23. J. MOORE & W. PHILLIPS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS RIGHTS 1-1 (1966).
24. Id
25. Id at 1-1, 1-2.
26. Id at 1-2. See also 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *281-82; 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 229-33 (2d ed. 1937); F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 596-97 (2d ed. 1898); Fox, Process of Imprisonment at Com-
mon Law, 39 LAW Q. REV. 46 (1923).
27. See Law of June 3, 1715, ch. 40, § 7, 1715 Md. Laws. Minor reforms in Maryland later
required the creditor to pay eighty-seven and one-half cents a week for the support of his
debtor while the debtor remained in prison, Law of Feb. 14, 1821, ch. 186, § 1, 1820 Md.
Laws, and abolished imprisonment for women, Law of Feb. 26, 1825, ch. 206, 1824 Md.
Laws 155.
28. Ford, Imprisonment for DebA 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 28-29 (1926).
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By the 1920's, most states, by statute or constitutional amend-
ment, had abolished imprisonment for debt except in certain
enumerated situations.2 9 Imprisonment for debt was abolished
primarily because it was such an ineffective enforcement tool
Imprisonment frequently failed to achieve the desired result because
some debtors elected to remain in jail rather than to have their
assets seized.30  Further, it penalized the debtor's innocent
dependents and deprived the community of the prisoner's labor.31
The original Constitution of Maryland did not specifically pro-
hibit imprisonment for debt,32 but a provision added in the Constitu-
tion of 1851 provided that "[no person shall be imprisoned for
debt. '33 Although this provision appeared to be clear and concise,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland was soon called upon to interpret
the meaning of the word "debt." First faced with that question in
1854, the court, in State v. Mace,34 determined that a person could be
imprisoned for failure to pay a fine imposed for violation of a public
law. 35 The court stated that if the constitutional provision were given
its "common sense interpretation, '36 the term "debt" would be
understood as an obligation arising other than from a court sentence
for breach of the peace or commission of a crime.37 The court found
that the intention of the framers of the constitutional provision was
to "relieve those who could not pay their debts, and not to shield
from punishment persons who had violated the public law. ' 38 In
another early case, State v. Nicholson,39 the court of appeals held
that imprisonment of a tax collector who defaulted in paying over
the money he had collected was not a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.40 The court in Nicholson
29. For a list of the various state constitutional provisions and statutes, see Note, Present
Status of Execution Aeainst the Body of the Judgment Debtor, 42 IOWA L. REv. 306,
307-08 nn. 15-23 (1957). The exceptions included willful torts, torts generally, fraud,
libel or slander, breach of a fiduciary relationship, and absconding debtors. Id at 308.
30. P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 9 (1974).
31. Id
32. Article XXI of the original Declaration of Rights provided: "That no free man ought to be
taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RIGHTS
art. XXI.
33. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 44. In the constitutional revision of 1864, the section
became art. III, § 37. In the constitutional revision of 1867, the section became art. III,
§ 38 as it remains to date. See A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1915).
34. 5 Md. 337 (1854).
35. Id at 350-51.
36. Id at 350.
37. Id at 350-51.
38. Id at 351; see Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553, 565,87 A. 1080, 1084 (1913); State v. Glenn,
54 Md. 572, 604 (1880).
39. 67 Md. 1, 8 A. 817 (1887).
40. Id at 3, 8 A. at 818.
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drew a distinction between imprisonment for a debt and imprison-
ment for a breach of duty owed by a public officer.
41
The court of appeals applied this distinction between debt and
duty in a domestic relations context as early as 1928 when, inDickey
v. Dickey,"2 it held that the obligation to pay alimony was a duty
growing out of the marital relation and not a debt.43 Thus, a husband
found to be in default in making alimony payments could be
imprisoned for contempt of court without violating the constitu-
tional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The court's deci-
sion, however, was limited to strict alimony and did not include wife
support, which was deemed a contractual obligation, not a duty." As
a result of the Dickey decision,' 5 Maryland firmly aligned itself with
the majority of states, which have held that alimony is not a debt
within the constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting
imprisonment for debt.0
The Maryland courts had a more difficult time in determining
the status of child support under the constitution. As early as 1927,
the court of appeals recognized that a father was under a common
law obligation to support his minor children. 7 Later, however, the
court found the obligation of child support to be in the nature of a
debt within the scope of the constitutional provision, and therefore
the imprisonment of a father who defaulted on child support
41. Id
42. 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928).
43. Id at 681, 141 A. at 390.
44. Id The court was unclear in describing the distinction between strict alimony and sup-
port. It appears that strict alimony was limited to a provision by the husband for the
wife's support that continued only during their joint lives or as long as they lived
separately and apart. Id at 678, 141 A. at 388. If a support allowance in a decree were the
result of a previous agreement between the spouses or continued for a period of time other
than for the joint lives of the spouses, it was considered wife support. Id at 679, 141 A. at
389.
45. While Dickey is regarded as the first Maryland decision to apply the general rule that
alimony is not a debt within the constitutional meaning of debt, the idea that the payment
of alimony is a duty was not new. See Mann v. Mann, 144 Md. 518, 125 A. 74 (1924);
McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 189 (1883); Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537, 563 (1855).
46. See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 130 (1924). See also D. STEWART, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE § 378 (1884) ("the obligation to pay alimony is a duty rather than a debt"). Other
states recognizing the general rule include: Alabama, see Murray v. Murray, 84 Ala. 363,
4 So. 239 (1888); California, see Livingston v. Superior Ct., 117 Cal 633, 49 P. 836 (1897);
Florida, see Bronk v. State, 43 Fla. 461, 31 So. 248 (1901); Illinois, see O'Callaghan v.
O'Callaghan, 69 Ill 552 (1873); Mississippi, see Carper v. Carper, 94 Miss. 598, 48 So. 186
(1909); Nebraska, see Cain v. Miller, 109 Neb. 441, 191 N.W. 704 (1922); and Virginia, see
West v. West, 126 Va. 969, 101 S.E. 876 (1920).
47. Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644, 647, 135 A. 841, 842 (1927) (this case dealt with a father's
.obligation to his natural son and therefore did not distinguish between a natural parent
and a stepparent). See also 2 BLAcKSTONE's COMMENTARIES *446-49 (principle of
"natural law" in England that parents have duty to support natural children).
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payments was prohibited. 8 The rule that child support was a debt
created many difficulties for the courts because alimony and child
support were often joined in a single provision of a divorce decree. 49
B. The Maryland Constitutional Amendments of 1950 and 1962
Many inequities and hardships were created by the court's posi-
tion that only strict alimony 0 was excluded from the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt." The 1950 amendment
to article III, section 38 solved many of these problems by declaring
that agreements for wife support, dependent child support, and
alimony, if decreed or approved by a court of competent jurisdiction,
were not debts within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
52
With the passage of this amendment, the technical distinction
between alimony and support of a wife or dependent children was
finally abolished. Consequently, all three types of support could be
enforced by imprisonment of the defaulting person.
5 3
The constitutional amendment of 1962 added illegitimate
children to the categories that did not constitute a debt within the
48. Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606,6 A.2d 366 (1939); Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145
A. 488 (1929). The court's distinction between alimony and child support for purposes of
the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt placed Maryland clearly in
the minority. See, e.g., Hervey v. Hervey, 186 Ark. 179, 52 S.W.2d 963 (1932); Application
of Martin, 76 Idaho 179, 279 P.2d 873 (1955); Stonehill v. Stonehill, 146 Ind. 445, 45 N.E.
600 (1896); Roper v. Roper, 242 Ky. 658,47 S.W.2d 517 (1932); Slawski v. Slawski, 49 Ohio
App. 100, 195 N.E. 258 (1934); Lear v. Lear, 29 Wash. 2d 692, 189 P.2d 237 (1948).
49. See Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 6 A.2d 366 (1939); Cohen v. Cohen, 174 Md. 61, 197 A.
564 (1938). For a discussion of the difficulties created by the distinction between alimony
and child support, see 3 MD. L. REV. 93 (1938).
50. For an explanation of strict alimony, see La Chance v. La Chance, 28 Md. App. 571, 346
A.2d 676 (1975) and note 44 supr.
51. Se% e.g., Bauernschmidt v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 176 Md. 351, 4 A.2d 712 (1939)
(court refused to treat as alimony an award of money granted by. a California decree for
separate maintenance and effective as alimony in California, holding that the wife was an
ordinary contract creditor of the husband). Compare Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Robert-
son, 192 Md. 653, 65 A.2d 292 (1949) (court recognized that in certain instances a hus-
band's interest in a spendthrift trust could be reached by his wife or children to support
their claims against him for support) with Hitchens v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 193 Md.
62,66 A.2d 97 (1949) (separation agreement entitling wife to "permanent alimony" was in-
sufficient to bring her within alimony exception of Robertson, thus making wife a contract
creditor unable to reach spendthrift trust).
52. The amendment added the following clause to art. III, § 38: "but a valid decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction or agreement by decree of said court for the support of a wife or
dependent children, or for alimony, shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of this
section." MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (1867, amended 1950, 1962).
53. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 282, 412 A.2d 396, 401 (1980); see Kerr v. Kerr, 287 Md.
363, 412 A.2d 1001 (1980); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977); Speckler v.
Speckler, 256 Mc. 635, 261 A.2d 466 (1970); Johnson v. Johnson, 241 Md. 416, 216 A.2d
914 (1966); Bradford v. Futrell, 225 Md. 512, 171 A.2d 493 (1961); McCabe v. McCabe, 210
Md. 308, 123 A.2d 447 (1956); Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode, 36 Md. App. 557, 373 A.2d 1306
(1977); Crandall v. Crandall, 14 Md. App. 476, 287 A.2d 326 (1972).
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constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt.54 This
amendment, the result of a reform movement in Maryland to abolish
criminal bastardy laws,55 added enforcement power to the provisions
of the Maryland Code that require support of one's illegitimate
children.5 Those provisions repealed the bastardy laws and provided
for equity proceedings to determine paternity.57
The 1950 and 1962 amendments appeared to solve the many
problems of enforcing orders to support dependent and illegitimate
children. In Brown v. Brown, 8 however, the court of appeals was
confronted with a new issue - whether a "dependent child" includes
a stepchild for purposes of article III, section 38 of the Constitution
of Maryland.
IV. THE BROWN DECISION
In Brown v. Brown, 9 the court of appeals was presented with
the sole issue of whether a divorce decree incorporating an agree-
ment to pay support for a stepchild can be enforced by imprisonment
for contempt of court.60 To resolve this issue, the court first had to
determine whether a stepchild is a "dependent child" within article
III, section 38.61
In addressing this question, Judge Digges, writing for a unani-
mous court, first examined the intent of the framers of article III,
section 38, as amended,6 2 by reviewing the history of imprisonment
for debt, its abolition in Maryland, and the amendments to the con-
stitutional provision.6 3 The court found no intent on the part of the
framers of the 1950 amendment to expand the non-contractual (legal)
54. The amendment added the following clause to the 1950 version of section 38: "or for the
support of an illegitimate child or children." MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (1867, amended
1950, 1962).
55. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 282 n.7, 412 A.2d 396, 401 n.7 (1980).
56. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 66A-66P (1981).
57. See Corley v. Moore, 236 Md. 241, 203 A.2d 697 (1964).
58. 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980).
59. Id
60. Id at 276, 412 A.2d at 398.
61. Id at 282, 412 A.2d at 401.
62. Judge Digges noted that constitutional construction employs the same rules that are ap-
plied in statutory construction. Id at 277, 412 A.2d at 398-99. Thus, the court must con-
strue the enactment in a way that effectuates the intent of its framers. Perkins v.
Eskridge, 278 Md. 619,639,366 A.2d 21, 33 (1976). The intent is first sought from the pro-
vision's terminology, with each word being given its ordinary meaning. Harbor Island
Marina v. Calvert Co., 286 Md. 303, 311, 407 A.2d 738, 742 (1979). If the words are not
ambiguous, the court is prohibited from further inquiry. Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553,
560-61, 115 A.2d 281, 285 (1955). If the terminology is ambiguous, "it is permissible to
inquire into the prior state of the law, the previous and contemporary history of the peo-
ple, the circumstances attending the adoption of the organic law, as well as broad con-
siderations of expediency." Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. at 640-41, 366 A.2d at 34 (em-
phasis omitted).
63. 287 Md. 273, 278-82, 412 A.2d 396, 399-401 (1980).
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duty of child support to include stepchildren.64 Applying the guide-
line laid down in State v. Mace65 that the constitution be given a
"common sense interpretation, '66 the court accepted the position of
Mr. Brown that his stepchild was not a dependent child within the
meaning of section 38.67 The court believed that the use of the modi-
fying word "dependent" was a result of the recognition by the
framers of section 38 that there may be a natural child of a parent
"who, although still a minor, requires no support from the parent
because the infant is emancipated ... ,or who, although an adult, is
legally dependent upon that parent because he is incompetent, or
otherwise incapable of caring and providing for himself. ' 68 Thus, it
appeared clear to the court that "what was sought to be, and actu-
ally was, accomplished by the amendment was permission to enforce
by imprisonment, if need be, the legal and moral obligation of sup-
port ... that parents owed to their own children. '69 The court in-
dicated that the legal duty to support one's own children does not
ordinarily encompass stepchildren.
70
To buttress its interpretation of section 38, the court looked at
the meaning of the word "child" as it had been previously defined by
the courts of Maryland and other states.7 The court also noted that
if the word "children" within the context of "dependent children"
were intended to have a definition broad enough to encompass step-
children it would also be broad enough to encompass illegitimate
children and the 1962 amendment to section 38 therefore would have
been unnecessary.72 The court believed that if it accepted Mrs.
Brown's broad construction of the word "children," it would cause
the phrase "or for the support of an illegitimate child or children,"
which was added in 1962, to be nugatory, a result that would be
repugnant to recognized canons of constitutional interpretation. 73 In
addition, the court examined how the legislature had defined the
word "child" in the past and noted that when the legislature
64. Id at 282, 412 A.2d at 401.
65. 5 Md. 337 (1854).
66. Id at 350. By "common sense interpretation," the court meant "the sense in which it was
understood by those who adopted it." Id
67. 287 Md. 273, 283, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980); see Brief for Appellant at 6-11, Brown v.
Brown, 287 Md. 273, 412 A.2d 396 (1980).
68. 287 Md. 273, 283, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980).
69. Id at 282-83, 412 A.2d at 401 (emphasis in original).
70. Id at 283-84, 412 A.2d at 401-02.
71. The court cited several sources that indicated that the common meaning of the word
"child" is immediate offspring. Id at 284, 412 A.2d at 402; see Meisner v. United States,
295 F. 866, 868 (W.D. Mo. 1924); Billingsley v. Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 419, 171 A. 351,354
(1934); Albright v. Albright, 116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760 (1927).
72. 287 Md. 273, 285, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980).
73. Id at 285, 412 A.2d at 403; see Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553, 561, 115 A.2d 281, 285
(1955); Groome v. Gwinn, 43 Md. 572, 624 (1876).
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intended the word to have other than its ordinary meaning, it was
explicit in defining the scope of the word.1
4
Mrs. Brown's contention that the stepfather stood in loco paren-
tis to his stepchild and that as a result there existed a legal duty to
support was summarily dismissed by the court.7 The court reasoned
that "any obligation between a child and one standing in place of a
parent is necessarily not one owed by a parent to his own child, and
therefore .... not a duty owed to a 'dependent child' within the pur-
view of the 1950 amendment to section 38. ' ' 76 Finding that Mr.
Brown had assumed only a contractual obligation, which was not
addressed by the 1950 and 1962 amendments, the court held that
nothing more than a debt was created, and therefore under the con-
stitution he was immune from imprisonment.
77
In concluding its opinion, the court addressed a point not dis-
cussed by the parties, but utilized by the trial court. The chancellor
had reasoned that even if Mr. Brown's obligation were a debt within
the meaning of article III, section 38, imprisonment for contempt
was still an available enforcement tool because of Mr. Brown's
disregard of a direct order by the court to pay.78 Following earlier
precedent,79 the court of appeals rejected the chancellor's rationale,
concluding that when the decree only directs the payment of money,
the equity court is without authority to imprison for contempt
except in those circumstances outlined by article III, section 38.0
The court reasoned that the 1950 and 1962 amendments to section
38, allowing imprisonment for nonsupport in certain enumerated
instances, would have accomplished no change nor would they have
granted the equity courts new power if the chancellors already had
the power to imprison for contempt upon the disobeyance of an order
directing the payment of money.8 1 In support of its reasoning, the
court noted that if the chancellor's conclusion were correct, the 1851
prohibition against imprisonment for debt would have applied only
to actions at law. 2 Such a conclusion, according to the court, is
74. 287 Md. 273, 285, 412 A.2d 396, 402 (1980); see, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 45 (1979)
(aid to families with dependent children); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (1979) (child
abuse); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-901(b) (1980) (wrongful death). But see MD.
EST. & TRusTs CODE ANN. § 1-205 (1974) (specifically excludes stepchildren).
75. 287 Md. 273, 286 n.8, 412 A.2d 396, 403 n.8 (1980).
76. Id at 286, 412 A.2d at 403.
77. Id at 288, 412 A.2d at 404.
78. Id. at 286, 412 A.2d at 403.
79. See Yake v. Yake, 170 Md. 75, 78, 183 A. 555, 556-57 (1935); Bushman v. Bushman, 157
Md. 166, 170, 145 A. 488, 492 (1929); Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 681, 141 A. 387, 390
(1928); MD. R.P. 685; C. PHELPS, JURIDICAL EQUITY § 84, at 110-11 (1894).
80. 287 Md. 273, 287, 412 A.2d 396, 403 (1980).
81. Id at 287, 412 A.2d at 403-04.
82. Id at 287, 412 A.2d at 404.
198 [Vol. 10
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clearly at odds with both prior decisions of the court8 3 and with the
obvious intent of the framers of the 1950 and 1962 amendments to
section 38, who, by the use of the equity term "decree," understood
that ordinarily the section would apply in equity actions.8
The court further buttressed its reasoning by examining Mary-
land Rule of Procedure 685, which outlines the mechanisms available
to an equity court to enforce its decrees and orders." Rule 685 was
previously codified in article 16, section 222 of the 1951 Maryland
Code.8 6 That statute contained a clause expressly prohibiting
imprisonment when the order only directed the payment of
money.8 7 The clause was deleted from Rule 685, which superseded
the statute, because it was thought to be surplusage in view of arti-
cle III, section 38.88 The court thus believed that the rule impliedly
excludes imprisonment for contempt when the decree only directs
the payment of money.8 It was noted by the court that the opinion
should not be read as a "disparagement" of the employment of the
powers available to equity courts by virtue of Maryland Rule 685.90 In
view of the arsenal of enforcement tools available to equity courts,
the Brown court concluded that its decision should not hamper the
equity courts' ability to enforce their decrees.
V. ANALYSIS
The court's holding in Brown that a stepchild is not a dependent
child within the meaning of article III, section 38 is well-reasoned and
in line with the majority of other states. Most states have con-
sistently held, as did the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that a hus-
band is under no duty to support a stepchild and that any obligation
he assumes as a result of the child-stepfather relationship ends upon
dissolution of the marriage.91 The court of appeals correctly rea-
83. See, e.g., Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 A. 488 (1929); Dickey v. Dickey, 154
Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928).
84. 287 Md. 273, 287, 412 A.2d 396, 404 (1980).
85. Id at 287-88, 412 A.2d at 404.
86. The statute, originally enacted in 1860, was repealed in 1957 upon being superseded by
Maryland Rule of Procedure 685.
87. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 222 (1951) (repealed 1957).
88. 287 Md. 273, 287-88, 412 A.2d 396, 404 (1980).
89. Id at 288, 412 A.2d at 404.
90. Id
91. Se4 e.g., Harrington v. Harrington, 145 A.2d 121, 122 {D.C. 1958); Wood v. Wood, 116
Ga. 519, 143 S.E. 770 (1928); McDowell v. McDowell, 378 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1964); Bunder
v. Mains, 139 Me. 231, 28 A.2d 734 (1942); Parker v. Northomb, 65 Neb. 308, 91 N.W. 395
(1902); Falzo v. Falzo, 84 N.J. Super. 343, 202 A.2d 192 (1964); Peake v. Peake, 205 Misc.
393, 128 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1954); Sargent v. Foland, 104 Or. 296, 207 P. 349 (1922); Echols v.
Echols, 168 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). See also H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.2 (1968); 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
§ 14.80 (rev. 2d ed. 1961); Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship:
Cinderella Revisited 4 FAM. L.Q. 209 (1970); Note, Stepchildren and In Loco Parentis
Relationships 52 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1939).
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soned, after examining similar legislative enactments, that the
framers did not intend the term "dependent child," as used in the
1950 amendment to article III, section 38, to encompass
stepchildren.92 The policy reason behind the passage of the 1950 and
1962 amendments was to provide enforcement power to equity courts
that ordered support payments for those dependent and illegitimate
children whose parents were under a common law duty to support
them.93 Stepparents are under no such common law duty.
9 4
The Brown decision further clarifies Maryland's position that
stepchildren are afforded less protection than natural children. It is
inequitable that Maryland, like so many other states, 95 has failed to
provide adequate protection for stepchildren, but the court of
appeals need not accept full responsibility for that fact. The court
looks to the legislature and its intent before reaching its decisions,
and the legislature has been remiss in addressing the status of step-
children. Until the General Assembly offers some guidance as to the
rights of stepchildren and the duties of stepparents, stepchildren in
Maryland will only be provided support when a stepparent feels he
has a personal, moral obligation - an obligation that, according to
one court, can be "cast off at any time." 9
The Brown court's holding as to an equity court's power to
imprison for the disobeyance of a court order is inconsistent with the
rule in many other states.97 Relying on Dickey v. Dickey,98 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that when "a decree only directs the
payment of money, a party defendant, who has been brought into
court under process of contempt to compel the performance of such a
92. See text accompanying notes 61-70 supra. Most state courts follow the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Kansas that "[hiad the legislature intended that stepchildren be includ-
ed in [a statute]... words... could easily have been added." Zeller v. Zeller, 195 Kan. 452,
456, 407 P.2d 478, 482 (1965). But see MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-205 (1974)
(specifically excludes stepchildren).
93. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 282-83, 412 A.2d 396, 401-02 (1980); see note 47 and ac-
companying text supra.
94. See H. CLARK, THE LAWOF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.2 (1968); 2 W.
NELSON, DIVORcE AND ANNULMENT § 14.80 (rev. 2d ed. 1961); Berkowitz, Legal Incidents
of Today's "Step"Relationship: Cinderella Revisite4 4 FAM. L.Q. 209 (1970); Note, Step-
children and Ia Loco Parentis Relationships 52 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1939). See also MD.
ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978). Section one of article 72A is the codification of the com-
mon law duty to support one's children and has been held applicable to legitimate children
only. Williams v. Williams, 18 Md. App. 353, 306 A.2d 564 (1973).
95. See note 91 supra.
96. State ex rel Hardesty v. Sparks, 28 Tenn. App. 329, 336, 190 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1945).
97. See, e.g., Usery v. Fisher, 565 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1977) (applying Colorado law); Harrison
v. Harrison, 239 Ark. 756, 395 S.W.2d 128 (1965); Wells v. Wells, 358 A.2d 648 (D.C.
1976); Newell v. Newell, 237 Ga. 708, 229 S.E.2d 793 (1976); Singer v. Singer, 52 A.D.2d
774, 382 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1976); In re Clift's Estate, 108 Utah 336, 159 P.2d 872 (1945);
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Mews, 29 Wis. 2d 44, 138 N.W.2d 147 (1965).
98. 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928).
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decree, may not be imprisoned."" Because the court found that the
circuit court's order to pay support for a stepchild was only a money
decree rather than a support order within the meaning of article III,
section 38, imprisonment of Mr. Brown was not an available enforce-
ment method when he defaulted. 00 Some states, however, apply a
different rationale, which allows equity courts to imprison in such a
situation. Those states utilize the same reasoning as the circuit court
chancellor in Brown. "Contempt powers deal ... with a far broader
scope of cases than those that are just coupled with child support,
contempt is the sanction for disobedience of a court order ... ."101
Thus, if one is in contempt of a court order in those states, he may be
imprisoned, not for the debt itself, but because of his disobedience of
the court order. Such reasoning is not unreasonably harsh when
one considers that incarceration is a coercive measure to be applied
only when one willfully disobeys a court order. If the party subject to
the court order can prove indigency or inability to pay, the measure
is not applied.'0
Unlike those states that permit imprisonment for the contempt
itself, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has limited the power of
equity courts to imprison for contempt when money decrees are
involved to those exceptions outlined in article III, section 38. The
court in Brown took the position that chancellors have a wide array
of enforcement tools by virtue of Maryland Rule of Procedure 685.103
The advantage, however, of giving equity courts the authority to
imprison for contempt of its orders is that it adds coercive power to
the decrees. When imprisonment is the consequence of disobeying an
order, that fact will influence the parties with respect to the agree-
ment involved.'0 4 The knowledge that incarceration is not available
as a coercive measure may encourage a party, such as a stepparent,
to take on obligations of support he has no intention of carrying
out.105 If imprisonment were a possible result of default, parties
would be more honest and cautious when entering into support
agreements that do not fall squarely within the scope of article III,
section 38.
As a result of the Brown decision, the court of appeals has
99. 287 Md. 273, 286-87,412 A.2d 396,403 (quoting Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675,681, 141
A. 387, 390 (1928)).
100. 287 Md. 273, 288, 412 A.2d 396, 404 (1980).
101. Id at 276, 412 A.2d at 398; see, e-g., Usery v. Fisher, 565 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1977) (apply-
ing Colorado law); Harrison v. Harrison, 239 Ark. 756, 395 S.W.2d 128 (1965); Wells v.
Wells, 358 A.2d 648 (D.C. 1976); Newell v. Newell, 237 Ga. 708, 229 S.E.2d 793 (1976);
Singer v. Singer, 52 A.D.2d 774, 382 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1976); In rm Clift's Estate, 108 Utah
336, 159 P.2d 872 (1945); Wisconsin Employment Relations ld. v. Mews, 29 Wis. 2d 44,
138 N.W.2d 147 (1965).
102. See McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 695, 262 A.2d 52, 58 (1970).
103. 287 Md. 273, 288, 412 A.2d 396, 404; see text accompanying note 106 infra.
104. Keltner v. Keltner, 589 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo. 1979).
105. Id at 240.
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expressly limited the enforcement of agreements to support stepchil-
dren to those tools authorized by Maryland Rule of Procedure 685.
Those tools include: sequestration of the real and personal estate and
effects of the defendant; issuance of a fieri facias against the lands,
tenements, goods, and chattels of the defendant; attachment by way
of execution against the lands, tenements, goods, and chattels of the
defendant; and injunction."0 The court did acknowledge that a con-
tractual obligation such as the one found in Brown can also be
enforced by means of an assumpsit action.
0 7
Because an order for the support of a stepchild is viewed in
Maryland as a contractual obligation rather than a legal duty and
therefore cannot be enforced through imprisonment by virtue of arti-
cle III, section 38, the question remains whether the order can be
enforced through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (URESA).'18 That act, adopted in all fifty states, plus Guam, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands,"9 was
designed to provide an additional method of enforcing spousal and
child support orders on an interstate basis."10 Under the URESA, a
petition to enforce a duty to support may be filed in any state regard-
less of where the person owing the duty resides."' The state in which
the action is initiated must first make a preliminary finding of a duty
of support 2 and then forward the petition to the state in which the
obligor resides (responding state).1" 3 The petition is then heard by the
responding state."
4
Under the Act, "duty of support" is intended to encompass any
possible support duty created by a particular state,"5 including
those duties "imposed or imposable by law or by order, decree, or
judgment of any court.""16 In determining whether a duty of support
exists, the applicable law is the law of the state where the obligor
was present for the period during which support is sought." 7 If the
106. MD. R.P. 685.
107. 287 Md. 273, 277, 412 A.2d 396, 398 (1980).
108. This act is codified in Maryland as MD. ANN. CODE art. 89C, §§ 1-39 (1979).
109. Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Ac; 12 FAM. L.Q. 113, 113-14
(1978).
110. Id at 114.
111. Id
112. Id at 115.
113. Id at 123.
114. Id at 115; see UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 7, 14; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 89C, §§ 7, 14(a) (1979). See also W. BROCKELBACK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF
FAMILY SUPPORT 42-43 (2d ed. 1971).
115. Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Ac4 12 FAM. L.Q. 113, 116 (1978).
116. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 2(b); MD. ANN. CODE art. 89C, §
2(g) (1979).




obligor incurred a duty in one state and then moved to a responding
state that does not recognize such a duty, the responding state
would be bound to enforce that duty only to the extent of any
arrearages that accrued before the obligor moved to the responding
state.1 8 Thus, if a party initiated an action to enforce a support order
from a state that recognizes a duty to support one's stepchildren and
Maryland was the responding state, Maryland would be under no
legal obligation to impose any duty on the obligor that accrued after
he moved to Maryland. Because a majority of states adopt the view,
as Maryland did in Brown, that a stepparent owes no legal duty to
support a stepchild, it is unlikely that the URESA would provide an
adequate method of enforcing an order or decree to support a step-
child against an obligor residing in one of those states. A party
attempting to enforce such an order therefore would be limited to
enforcement of the order as a contractual obligation. As such, it
should be recognized by other states under the full faith and credit
clause.119
VI. CONCLUSION
As a result of Brown v. Brown, Maryland aligns itself with the
majority view that a stepparent is under no legal duty to support a
stepchild. Thus, an agreement to support a stepchild that has been
incorporated into a divorce decree cannot be enforced by imprison-
ment because it does not fall within the exceptions to the constitu-
tional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. In light of the in-
creasing number of stepparent relationships, it is time for the
legislature to define the rights of stepchildren and the duties and
responsibilities of stepparents. Until such action is taken, any agree-
ment to support a stepchild will be viewed as a contractual obliga-
tion. As such, the remedies available to enforce a contractual obliga-
tion to support a stepchild are limited to those authorized by
Maryland Rule of Procedure 685 or an action in assumpsit. It also
appears that an order to support a stepchild would not be en-
forceable in other states through the Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act because most states, like Maryland, find no
legal duty to support a stepchild.
In addition, the Brown court reaffirmed its position that impris-
onment for contempt is unavailable when the decree only directs the
118. Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Ac; 12 FAm. L.Q. 113, 117 (1978).
For example, the Arizona Attorney General has ruled that a Michigan duty imposed on
children requiring them to support their indigent parents may not be imposed on an
obligor found in Arizona. Id
119. Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818) (a judgment should receive the
same effect in sister states that it enjoys in the state of its rendition).
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payment of money, unless it falls within the exceptions of article III,
section 38. The court's holding is inconsistent with the rule in many
other states, which permits imprisonment for contempt, not for the
debt, but for the willful disobedience of a court order. The rule allow-
ing imprisonment appears to be well-reasoned and adds coercive
power to court decrees. Further, it is not unreasonably harsh because
a party may avoid being held in contempt by showing an inability
to pay. If Maryland were to permit equity courts to imprison for the
willful disobedience of their decrees, it would certainly have the
effect of strengthening the position of equity courts and might addi-
tionally encourage parties to enter into agreements more honestly
and carefully.
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